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14 Towards an aesthetics for educational 
administration 
Hichard ]. Bates 
Just as Weber's explication of the characteristics of bureaucracy has dominated 
much of the discourse in organisational and administrative theory for the past 
century, his explication of charisma has dominated the field of leadership. The 
paradox inherent in demanding charismatic leadership within increasingly ratio-
nalised organisations would not: be lost on \V'eber. The 'enchantment' inherent 
in charismatic perfmmance sits oddly with the 'disenchantment' of Weber's 
hyper-rationalised world of strategic and routinised organisations. 
In current texts educational leaders are, like other le<lders, exhorted to exercise 
charismatic leadership: to 'envision' the mission of their organisation; to 'celebrate' 
its culture; to 'symbolise' and 'petform' it~ purpose. The 'art' of leadership is at once 
strategic - as in the 'art' of war (Ribbins and Zhang 2003a; 2003b); moral- as in 
the 'ethic' of administration (Hodgkinson 1991); and aesthetic - as in the 'perfor-
mance' of culture (Starratt 1990; 1993). TIle ideal leader is indeed an aesthetic 
accomplishment of the self. There are echoes here (though somewhat remote) of 
the Greek ideal of kalos kagatho5 - the man (always and only a man) both beautiful 
and good (or perhaps more precisely, the man both beautiful and noble). 
1ne embodiment of virtue and the aesthetic performance of the self are both 
caught up i.n recent pkthora of texts on school culture. Deal and Peterson's text 
Shaping School Culture: The Heart of Leadership (1999), typifies this genre in its 
emphasis on the importance of symbolic leadership in the shaping of school cul-
ture. Ar!;'Uing that their analysis is rooted in an anthropological understanding of 
culture, Deal and Peterson suggest eight key roles for educational leaders as they 
perform their cultural \vork: historian, anthropological sleuth, visionary, symbol-
ist, potter, poet, actor and healer (1999: 87-8). Clearly many of these roles are 
essentially aesthetic in that they involve imagination (visionary), representation 
(symbolist), production (potter), celebration (poet) and performance (actor). 
Aesthetics is seen as a crucial component in the building of a 'strong school cul-
mre', one underpinned by 'informal fCllkways and I:raditions that infuse work with 
meaning, passion and purpose' (1999: 1). 
Such texts argue that aesthetic activities are instrumental, then, in building 
motivation and commitment: aesthetics have a moral purpose. Howard Schultz, 
CEO of Swrbucks, is quoted as an exemplar of such cultural leadership: 
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The key is heart. I pour my heart into every cup of coffee, and so do my part-
ners at Starbuck~. When customers sense that, they respond in kind. If you 
pour your heart into your work, or into any worthy enterprise, you can 
achieve dreams others may think impossible. 
(Schultz and Ym1g 1997 in Deal m1d Peterson 1999: 1) 
Deal and Peterson mmslate the message into the world of education: 
The need for some leaders to step forward and take the necessary risks to 
build positive school cultures has never been greater. If Starbucks' CEO can 
pour his heart into a cup of coffee, so too can school leaders pour their hearts 
into student learning. 
(Deal and Peterson 1999: 11) 
The same message is put even more forcefully by Saphier and King in their asser-
tion that 'Good seeds grow in strong cultures' (1985). 
Such a posicion is both blatant: and naive. It is blatant in its abandonment of 
the descriptiq,'e intention of anthropological approaches to culture and its appro-
priation of culture for managerial purposes (see Bates 1981; 1983; 1987; Angus 
199.3). It is nai've in its assumption that strong cultures articulated through pow-
erful aesl:hetics are necessarily moral or 'good'. It is also a position quite 
uninformed by debates over sllch issues in the field of aesthetics or more recent 
discussions of cultural studies, for both of these fields have been concerned with 
what might be called the politics of culture. 
As is made clear elsewhere in this volume, there is a significant tradition in 
aesthetics that fdlows [he (;reek ideal of harmony, where the man both beautiful 
and good epitomises the moral and aesthetic aspirations of a 'harmonious' cul-
ture. As O'Leary suggests, within this model; 
... there is a coakscence of aesthetics and ethics, with the result that every 
<l,:sthetic judgement - that something is beautiful, or harmonious - neces-
sarily implies an ethical judgement - that that thing is good, or praiseworthy. 
According to this model, there is no doubt that if one's life and one's behav-
iour have a beautiful form, then they will also be good. 
(O'Leary 1999: 1(1) 
Such a (Greek) ideal of harmony was, however, pursued within a culture where 
there were significant distinctions between enslaved and free, male and female, 
citizen and non-citizen. It was, therefore, an ideal open only to a free, male, citi-
zen elite such as that represented in the hierarchy of Plato's republic. 
It is, of course, possible to build a model of school culture that expresses such 
ideals of halmony and hierarchy. Indeed, the English 'public' school in many 
ways appealed to just such a rationale with its emphasis on physical prowess and 
beauty and its ethicaljaesdletk!political hierarchies. 
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The difficulty with slich a position is, however, its tendency towards audlOr-
itari.<ln manipulation. The most obvious exalllrli;~ of the dangers of ethical 
aestheticism lie not in the Greek and Roman examples, nor in the case of the 
English public school, but in the frightening images of the 'pelfectibility' of 
man inherent in the Nazi and fascist states during the first half of the twentieth 
century. 
In examini.ng such regimes Walter Benjamin (1973) argued that while tradi-
tionally an was bound up with (largely religiolls) ritual and was, in that sense, 
'authentic' in its representation of a shared culture, in the contemporary age 
where art can be 'mechanically' reproduced, it becomes instead a tool of polities. 
That is, art becorni;~s a means of propaganda and manipulation, substituting and 
imposing an artificial unity of purpose and ideals while repressing and marginal-
ising other aesthetic representations of politics and ethics, particularly those 
concerned with changing the status quo. O'Leary shows how Benjamin's thesis 
works: 
Benjamin elaborates this point by showing how fascism organises the newly 
formed masses while simultaneously maintaining existing property struc-
tures. It achieves this by giving its subjects merely 'a chance to express 
themselves' (Benjamin, 1973 p. 243). In newsreel footage of parades and ral-
lies, for example, the masses are brought 'face [0 face with themselves' (p. 
253) and they are given the opportunity to j)(Jrtray themselves. \'(1hat this 
means for Benjamin, is that the principle of aesthetic expression and the 
beautiful illusion (the schoner schein) takes precedence over the principle of 
political rights ... Fascism 'violates' the masses in the sam.e way that it vio-
lates the apparatlls of film in order to make it produce 'ri tual valui;;s' (p. 24.3). 
It proceeds by a successive aestheticisation (and hence ritualisation) of 
political life; it institutes the Fuhrer cult, it glorifies war, it confers upon the 
people, the blood, the soil the magical properties of the auratic cult object. 
(1999: 155) 
The result is an aestheticised politics through which a mass hysteria is engen-
dered and in which cult-like rituals persuade people to celebrate even their own 
destruction. As Caygill puts it, such an aestheticised politics persuades people to: 
... participm:e avidly in their own history while spectating it as someone else's 
history; they participate in political action and view it from a distance; they 
participate in their own destruction and enjoy the spectacle. 
(1994: 28) 
A similar destructive aestheticisation of politics was articulated in Italy by 
Marinetti whose work attempted to replace the centrality of 'woman' and 
'beauty' in traditional aesthetics with a monstrous invocation of the mechanical: 
' ... the wholly mastered, definitive Futlire aesthetic of great locomotives, twisting 
tunnels, armoured cars, mrpedo boars, monoplanes and racing cars' on which the 
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'young modem male' will focus his artemion as objects thar ' ... glow with plea-
sure beneath his ardent caress' (in Flint 1971: 81,90). 
\Vhile Marinetti was wri ting in 1909, his aesthetic was incorporated into both 
italian and German Fascism. Junger, for instance, echoed Marinetti in celebrat-
ing the unifying aesthetic of the machine: 
Today we are writing poems of steel, and we are fighting fix power in battles 
that unfold with the precision of machines. There is a beauty in it which we 
can already sense: in these battles on land, on sea and in the air in which the 
hot will of our blood controls itself and finds expression in the mastery of the 
technical miracle machines of power. 
(Junger in Berman 1989: 78) 
The purpose of all this aestheticised power was not the liberation of the self and 
its construction according to personal conceptions of the beautiful and the good, 
nor even a construction of the self which conformed to a particular harmonious 
cultural tradition, but rather the coercion of individuals into a unified, national-
istic conception of the self that at once celebrated and was subordinated to a 
particular image of the nation engineered by the artististatesman. As O'Leary 
suggests: 
If there is something characterL~tic about the fascist aestheticisation of poli-
tics then, it must be sought in this insistence upon the ideal of a 
non-fractured subject which finds itself reassuringly reflected in a non-frac-
tured, unifoon public space. When thought of in these teons, it becomes 
possible to understand and explain the fascist theme of the politician as the 
plastic artist who moulds the people to his will, and gives them a harmonious 
and beautiful {tmn. 
(1999: 158-9) 
Education was, of course, a major instrument in the creation of a 'Volk', a people 
who were motivated and committed to a particular vision of their personal and 
political future (Sunker and Otto 1996). Educational administrators/leaders were 
themselves required to be both the personification of the vision and the man-
agers of its implemenmtioll through an aesthetic of education that carried both 
cultural and political ideals. 
This particular juxtaposition of aesthetics, ethics and politicS is surely not 
what Deal and Peterson have in mind. But, as their only goal in the shaping of a 
strong school culture is a somewhat generalised encouragement of learning 
within a shared, common vi.sion, such a result is not discounted by their view of 
culture, aesthetics, ethics and the practice of educational leadership (1999). 
There is, of course, an altemative tradition stemming from Kant that sees aes-
thetics as an autonomous activity with purposes and criteria of its own 
independent of religious/political/cultural concems. As this is articulated in_ 
other papers in this volume i.t will not: be dealt with at: length here. In passing, 
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however, it is interesting to note that the reaction of many artists to the totali-
tarianisms of fascism and communism - of the right and the left: - was to assert 
the 'independence' of art and the need of the artist for 'free expression'. As rep-
resentational art was inescapably descriptive and therefore caught up in the 
brutality of contemporary life, the only possible solution was the creation of 
'abstract' art. Abstract expressionism was, indeed, an assertion of the autonomy 
of art. It was: 
... for many, the expression of freedom: the freedom to create controversial 
works of art, the freedom symbolized by action painting, by the unbridled 
expressionism of artists completely without fetters. 
(Guilbaut: 1983: 201) 
However, even in this case, politics caught up with art. As Guilbaut observes, 
abstract expressi.onism itself became a weapon in the ideological battles of the 
Cold War. It was interpreted within a highly politicised context. 
In the first place it was argued that: 
The brutality of the modem world can wear dmvn the individual. Against 
this brutality the artist was supposed to bt~ a shining example of the individ-
ual will set against the dull uniformity of totalitarian society. 
(Guilbaut 1983: 200) 
Within this context: 
Freedom was the symbol most actively and vigorously promoted by the new 
liberalism in the Cold War period. Expressionism stood for the difference 
between a free society and a totalitarian one. Art was able to package the 
virtues of liberal society and lay down a challenge to its enemies: it aroused 
polemic \vithout couning danger. 
(Guilbaut 1983: 201) 
So even the ideal of the autonomy of aesthetics was appropriated politically in 
the cultural battles of the Cold War. 
To others, of course, aesthetics and politics are historically linked in many 
jurisdictions - not simply in Fascist states. Eagleton (1990), in his Ideology of the 
Aesthetic, argues that Kant's assertion of the autonomy of the aesthetic realm pro-
vides a necessalY disguise for the cultural and political assertion of bourgeois 
hegemony. In other words Eagleton argues that: 
... Kant's aesthetic has to account for, or display, bourgeois ideology, bour-
geoiS morality and bourgeois commodity in homologous relationship. The 
ruling order ... needs Kant's epistemology: it needs a persuasive account of 
freedom which masks the manoeuvres of the ideology of privatt~ capital. 
(Armstrong 2000: 34) 
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The result is the modern aestheticised state where the first mechanism of 
repressi.on is an appeal to the aesthetic: the cultural/political combination of 
desire and morality that construct the motivation for a particular way of life, a 
particular way of being. Once again, education is a significant mechanism for 
the production and distribution of such an aesthetic and educational adminis-
trators/leaders are instrumental in the articulation (enforcemem?) of both 
vision and practice. 
The aestheticised state need not, of course, be totalitarian in its control of cul-
tural agencies. It may simply support the articulation of cultural agencies in a 
particular form. In many contemporary societies the form is that of capitalism. 
Indeed it is the theoretical analysis of the structures of power and finance inher-
em in capitalism that provide the model for Bourdieu's models of cultwal and 
symbolic capital. 
In his most fully worked out explications of the importance of cultural capital 
Bourdieu (1984; 1993) argues that just as financial capital is acc.umulated through 
family contacts, business networks, associations, class relations, economic insti-
tutions and political power, cultural capital is accumulated through family 
training, education, class location and associated cultural codes which facilitate 
access to and the accumulation of prestige. Much of this prestige is dependem 
upon the accumulation of symbolic capital that is constimted as a hierarchy of 
privileged knowledge through which aesthetic and social value is produced. 
Individuals and their families are positioned in social space by their possession of 
particular kinds of symbolic capital. Their cultural relations are identified and 
determined by their location in that space. While analogous to the distribution 
and anicuhtion of financial capital, symbolic capital is somewhat independent 
of the structures of financial capital. Indeed, its main justification in th,~ confer-
ring of prestige or 'distinction' is the claim of aesthetics ()[ 'taste' to be an 
autonomous sphere and its promotion of 'the charismatic. image of artistic activ-
ity as pure, disinterested creation by an isolated artist' (Bourdieu 1993: 34). 
Symbolic capital and its distribution is articulated through a network of insti-
tutions such as art galleries and museums, cultural agencies, theatres, publishing 
houses, and f()undations which constitute the infrastructure for the 'manage-
ment' of symbolic capital. While the claim is made that the art produced and 
regulated by these institutions is autonomous and 'disinterested', Bourdieu insists 
that they function to legitimate the hierarchies of symbolic power upon which 
the possession of symbolic capital depends. They are sites of continuous struggle 
over what is to constitute 'art' and articulate the rules of inclusion and exclusion, 
regulation, access and value which consecrate the value of symbolic capital, dis-
tinction and prestige. Culmral wars are fought within and between such 
institutions with a Darwinian intensity in order to 'impose a legitimate definit:ion 
of art and literature' (Bourdieu 1993: 41). 
What constitutes legitimate art and literature at anyone time is necessarily 
related to the struggles going on between classes and, perhaps most especially, 
within the dominant class: 
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The stnlggle in the field of cultural production over the imposition of the 
legitimate mode of cultural production is inseparable from the struggle 
within the dominant class ... to impose the dominant principle of domina-
tion (that is to say - ultimately - the definition of human accomplishment). 
(Bourdieu 1993: 41) 
Definicions of human accomplishment are, of course, crucial to education boch 
in terms of the content of the curriculum (what constitutes appropriate knowl-
ed.ge) and the pedagogy (what constitutes appropriate behaviour and relations) 
within educational institutions. Educational administratorsileaders are crucial 
figures in the definition and policing of accomplishment, both through their 
articulation (visioning?) of a particular aesthetic and through their disciplining 
of deviance. They tend, as do most intellectuals, to take conservative positions in 
the cultural wars over curriculum and pedagogy, those educational carriers of 
symbolic capital. As Bourdieu points out: 
All the evidence suggests that, at a given level of autonomy, intellectuals 
are, other things being equal, proportionately more responsive to the seduc-
tion of the powers that be ... 
(1993: 41) 
Moreover, educational administrators typicaily not only articulate the vision of 
the powers that be, but also preside over educational institutions that confirm 
both rank and distinction through the legitimation of particular (conservative) 
definitions of cultural capital and the 'consecration' of those, and only those, 
who can be considered to possess such capital. In this respect 'the school institu-
tion perfonns a truly magical operation, the paradigm of which is the separation 
between the sacred and the profane' (Bourdieu 1998: 21). 
As is the claim in the realm of aesthetics, the school also claims autonomy 
from existing structures of financial and cultural capital, suggesting that talent 
and effort are the sole requirelllent~ for sllccess. In fact, suggests Bourdieu, far 
from challenging the inherited distribution of symbolic capital, the school typi-
cally confinns it. The school simply: 
... maintains the preexisting order, that is, the gap between pupils endowed 
with unequal amounts of cultural capital. More precisely, by a series of selec-
tion operations, the system separates the holders of inherited cultural capital 
from those who lack it. Differences of aptitude being inseparable from social 
differences according to inherited capital, the system thus tends to maintain 
preexisting social differences. 
(1998: 20) 
The articulation of a particular vision by educational administrators and the clas-
sjfication of teachers and pupils in terrns of their confomlity with that vision as 
successful or unsuccessful, can, therdore, be seen as a mechanism through which 
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individuals are located in social, cultural or symbolic space and defined more or 
less permanently by that location - notwithstanding the school's embrace of the 
ideology of promotion by merit. This is an aesthetic as well as a functional classi-
fication, one that marks the difference between 'purity' and 'danger' (Douglas 
1970; Durkheim 1971). Bourdieu discusses this distinction in similar terms, COIl-
trasting the school's role in protecting the purity of the ordained social order 
against the danger of d10se unconsecrated by such noble affiliation: 
The act of scholastic classification is always ... an act of ordination ... It insti-
tutes a social difference of rank, a permanent reultion of order: the elect are 
marked, for their whole lives, by their affiliation ... j they are members of an 
order, in the medi.eval sense of the word, and of a noble order, that is, a 
clearly delimited set (one either belongs or one doesn't) of people who are 
separated from the common run of mortals by a difference of essence and, 
therefore, legitimately licensed to dominate. This is why the separation 
achieved by the school is also an act of ordination in rhe sense of consecra-
tion, enthronement: in a sacred category, a nobility. 
(Bourdieu 1998: 21) 
The work of educational administrators is, thert:fore, aesthetic, not only in terms 
of their vision of school culture and their embodiment of that vision in the aes-
thetic performance of the self, but also in the act of consecration of a particular 
aesthetic distinction between purity and danger, between the noble and the 
mundane and their classification of individuals according to such categories. 
Such classification is crucial to the maintenance of social distinction. /\s T. S. 
Eliot argued in his Notes Towards the Definition o!Culture, Culture, with a capital 
C, was necessarily regarded as a minority pursuit: 
To aim to make ... the 'uneducated' mass of the population ... share in the 
appreciation of the fruits of the most conscious part of culture is to adulter-
ate and cheapen what you give, for it is an essential condition of the 
preservation of the quality of the culture of the minority that it should con-
tinue to be a minority culture. 
(1948: 32) 
Eliot's concem was the maintenance of high culture and its defence against [he 
emergence of the masses. Here Eliot was in the company of others such as 
Leavis, who articulated such a view at greater length in his Mass Civilization 
and Minority Culture (1933) and his auempted codification of the canons of 
high culture in poetry (Re~'a[uation 1936) and the English novel (The Great 
n·adition 1962). More recently and controversially Bloom's The Closing of the 
American Mind (1987) provided another attempt to defend high culture against 
the depredations of working class, minority, ethnic and feminist cultures. 
Adorno (1984; 1991) had a similar view of The Culture Industry and its 'adrnin-
i.stra tion of culture'. 
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Here, of course, is a perfect example of the attempt to maintain privileged def-
initions of culture and to articulate them in social, cultural or aesthedc 'space' in 
ways that define and legitimate hierarchies of aesthetic, cultural and social 
power. Eliot, Leavis, Bloom, and a legion of others were attempting to defend 
such a notion of elite culture against the emergence of mass culture articulated, 
for instance, through cinema, popular music, 'gutter' journalism, radio and tele-
vision. In l"\ventiet:h century England, of course, this argument was carried 
through into the visible separation of the grammar (elite cultUL"e) and secondary 
modem (mass culture) schools: a structural, symbolic and classed system of the 
most impermeable kind. 
Nonetheless, despite the boundaries created by sllch a system, some working 
class boys did manage to cross over from working class to elitt: educational sys-
tems. Among the first generation of working class boys to do so in England were 
the founders of the 'cultural studies' movement, Richard Hoggart, Raymond 
Williams, and Stuart HaH in particular. Working at the Centre for Contemporary 
Cultural Studies at the University of Birmingham they were among the first writ-
ers to suggest that cultural criticism could be constructed from a working class 
perspective. \Villiams, in particular, argued that it was possible, through disci-
plined study, to learn about other cultures and to lmderstand their perspectives -
dleir canons and criteria of t:valuatioll, their aesthetic, and the ways in which 
their cultural identity was formed (se,~ Gorak 1988; Williams 1958; 1961; 1980). 
The cultural studies group mounted a major challenge to the position articulated 
by Eliot and Leavis. 
They did so by redefining the notion of culture and opposing the 'literary' 
notion of high culture with a: 
... 'social' definition of culture, in which culture is a description of a particu-
lar way of life, which expresses certain meanings and values, not only in art 
and learning, but also in institutions and ordinary behaviour. 
(Williams 1961: 57) 
Such a turn was quite consistent with another tradition derived from anthropol-
ogy, which, in its study of primitive cultures, adopted a similar view but which 
was only just beginning to apply the same techniques of cultural analysis to con-
temporary societies. 
Coupled with a moo-Marxist understanding of social relations, this school of 
thought developed quickly an analysis of cultural relations, cultural production 
and cultural reproduction which showed how culture was segmented and hier-
achised and how it was reproduced in the institutions and practices of everyday 
life. Aesthetic differentiation was seen as a mechanism of the reproduction of 
cultural and social difference: it served a stmctural and an ideological purpose: 
The reproduction of the social relations of production requires, in class soci-
eties, the cominual production of specifically classed and gendered 
individuals within an ideological field that naturalizes existing classes and 
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genders. In the broadest sense, the work of ideologies is to represent histori-
cal contradictions as natuml: as immutable differences (between man and 
women, blacks and whites, 'cilem' and 'us', the 'successful' and the (idle'); as 
rich or amusing variety «it takes all sorts', vive Ii! difference"); as mutual 
dependency ('different but equal', social contract, a share of the profits); or 
as men~ appearances subsumed in a largn uniL)' (the family, the British peo-
ple, 'we're all human beings'). All these and many other forms of 
naturalization are at work in developed social formations, not only in those 
institutions of the superstructure (school, church, family) that directly 'man-
ufacture' ideology, but also in the most intimate interstices and very 
atmospheres of public and private life. 
(Hall 1980: 261-2) 
At first, the idea of reproduction and the ideological domination of by elites of 
cultural institutions was a focus of study. More recently, however, the study of 
culture as a 'way of life' has mutated into the study of cultural practices of particu-
lar groups and their interactions. Simultaneously, as Paul Ri.coeur (1986) 
suggests, the method of social science has shifted from the structural to the con-
versational, where the meaning of social life is to be understood through the 
analysis of the standpoint of i[S participants expressed in talk in small settings. 
Such a position leads to a rather different view of society: one that is articu-
lated not through structure, but through negotiation between cultural practices 
of enonnous diversity. Society is a series of multiple realities each of which strug-
gles to articulate its interests and understandings through struggle and 
negotiation with mher 'realities'. Meaning itself, is produced through struggle 
and articulated through the aesthetics oflanguage, symbolism, perfl)rmance and 
artifice: 
... culture no longer refers to shared meanings that reflect people's way of life. 
Instead, cultural practices refer to [he many institutions, classes, and groups 
that compete in the articulation of the social meaning of things, to the many 
sites and positions from which knowledges and ideas are developed, and to 
the conflicts arising out of the struggle to stage performances and to affect 
audiences. 
(McCarthy 1996: 26) 
Such a view suggests a certain relativism in the conception of culture and the 
aesthetic practices through which it is negotiated. Such a plurality brings the 
very notion of meaning into question: the status of various claims as (fact', 'opin-
ion', 'knowledge' or 'ideology' are constantly dispmed as are the motivations 
behind certain dispositions: 
For these reasons and others, the study of cultural practices makes evident 
the problem of the politics of meaning. It raises questions about how partic-
ular cultural meanings came to be produced, why, and by whom. It forces 
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upon us the realization that the same cultural ideas, words and images often 
mean different things to different groups. And furthermore, the mi;~aning of 
something is continually subject to change both because social objects are 
multi-coded and because there are a multiplicity of 'languages'. The cultural 
order becomes the outcome of historically diverse and conflicting groups. 
(McCarthy 1996: 26) 
Such an anarchy of cultures is far from the ideal celebrated by Matthew Arnold 
in his advocacy of bringing the 'best that has been thought and said in the world' 
to the unruly masses thus insuring against revolution through the civilising effect 
of elite culture (1960; 27). 
But contemporary socinies are marked by such an anarchy of cultures, some 
developed from within, others the result of cultural contact and migration. The 
central issue in such a multifarious, post-modern world becomes that of how to 
communicate across cultural boundaries (Touraine 2000) and how to constmct 
'common institutions in which many forms oflife can coexist' (Gray 2000: 6). In 
essence this project: is an aesthetic project as i[ involves the exercise of imagina-
tion, presentation, pelformance, interpretation, and identification. The point 
here is that rationality or logic may well not be a sufficient vehicle for cross-cul-
tural communication as the paradigms of different cultures may be 
incommensurable (McKee 2005). 
This does not mean that different cultures cannot talk with one another, but 
that the mechanisms for doing so may depend upon translation, empathy and 
creativi.ty: 
The key skills for this kind of public debate are no longer training in formal 
or inf(xmal academic logic, but real life resources, snch as our abilities to be 
creative and our willingness to keep trying to communicate with people 
whose language of argument we might not at first understand. 
(McKee 2005: 161) 
Charles Taylor puts the same point in a somewhat different way: 
.' .. for a culture sufficiently different from our own, we may have only the fog-
giest idea ... of in what its valuable contribution might consist. Because, for a 
sufficiently di.fferent culture, the very understanding of what it: is to be of 
worth will be strange and unfamiliar to us. To approach, say, a raga with the 
presumptions of value implicit in the well-tempered clavier would be forever 
to miss the point. \'Vhat has to happen is ... a 'fusion of horizons.' We learn. 
to move in a broader horizon, within which what we have fOnllerly taken for 
granted as the background to valuation can be situated as one possibility 
alongside the different background of the formerly unfamiliar culture. The 
'fusion of horizons' operates through our developing new vocabularies of 
comparison. 
(Taylor 1992: 67) 
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Dewey, of course, saw this imaginative process as fundamental to the aesthetic 
experience as wdl as to the process of education. In his Art and Experience he 
argued the centrality of imagination in coming to terms with the new and incor-
porating it into the construction of the self: the capacity to look at things as if 
they could be otherwise. This capacity, he suggests, is: 
... a way of seeing and feeling things as they compose an integral whole. It: is 
the large and generous blending of interests at the point where the mind 
comes into contact with the world. When old and familiar things are made 
new in experience, there is imagination. When the new is created, the far 
and smmge become the most natural inevitable things in the world. There is 
always some measure of adventure in the meeting of' mind and universe, and 
this adventure is, in its measure, imagination. 
(Dewey 1980: 267) 
Imagination, as a central component of aesthetic awareness and as a central 
process in the incorporation of the new and strange into our consciousness is, 
theref~)[e, fundamental in negotiations between 'cultures'. It is also fundamental 
in the process of education. Indeed, it can be seen as the everyday experience of 
children from various backgrounds in their attempts to come to tenns with the 
strangeness of the curricular, pedagogical and evaluative structures of schools. 
And, indeed, just as imagination is needed in our negotiation and interpreta-
tion of other cultures and the incorporation of such understanding into the 
curriculum of schools, so does our pedagogy need to be informed by such imagi-
ml[ion in our attempts to understand our students. Maxine Greene puts this 
necessir:y quite fi)('cefully: 
Those of us who 'do' aesthetic education, those of us who try to find spaces 
for it in problematic schools, are sensitive to the multiple life stories young 
people are carrying with them into our classrooms. \Y./e are sensitive to the 
muh:iple voices that need to be heard, the multiple vantage points from 
which the young look at an often uncaring world. At once, we are aware of 
what are thought of as multiple intelligences, as diverse symbol systems and 
languages for interpreting what presents itself as reality. And we are partiell-
lady conscious of the importance of imagination, so often omitted from 
education reports: imagination that allows us to open windows in the actual 
and disclose visions of what might be. 
(1988: 110) 
So here is an argument for the fundamental importance of the aesthetic in negoti-
ating difference through imagination: for the incorporation of the other in the 
experience of education (see also Greene 2001). Such a vision is particularly apt 
for education in a world of difference where the dangers of the authoritarian impo' 
sition of an dite culture or an aesthetically engin.eered politics of unity are present 
and real. It is also apt in a world where the retreat into gated communities within 
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which a shared and exclusionary vision provides an altemative authoritarianism 
and repressi.on (Bates 2005; Peshkin 1986; Touraine 2000). 
But the purpose of education is not simply to encourage people to understand 
the world they live in, in all its complexity and confusion, but also to empower 
students to act within it. The importance of the aesthetic is not simply, therefore, 
the encouragement of a som.ewhat passive connoisseurship, but the encourage-
rnen!: of agency. As Herbert Read argued: 
Education is, the fostering of growth, but apart from physical maturation, 
growth is only made apparent in expression - audible or visual signs and 
symbols. Education m.ay therefore be defined as the cultivation of modes of 
expression - it is teaching children and adults how to make sounds, images, 
movements, tools and utensils. A man who can make such things well is a 
well educated man. If he can make good sounds, he is a good speaker: if he 
can make good images, he is a good painter or sculptor; if good movements, 
a good dancer or labourer; if good utensils, a good craftsman. All faculties, of 
thought, memory, sensibility and intellect are involved in such processes. 
And they are all processes which involve art, for art is nothing but the good 
making of sounds, images, etc. The aim of education is therefore the creation 
of artists .... of people efficient in the various modes of expression, 
(1958: 11) 
The putpose of such expression, of such aesthetic capacity was, for Read, the 
capacity for self-expression within a democratic framework, one where the 
agency of individuals was acknowledged and valued. It followed that 'a democra-
tic education is the only guarantee of a democratic revolution: indeed, [0 
introduce a democratic method of education is the only necessaL'Y revolution' 
(Read 1958: 304). Here are echoes of Dewey's argument of the close relationship 
between aesthetics, civilisation and democracy (Dewey 1931; 1966; 1980). 
TIle role of th~ aesthetic in the encouragement of agency is a concern of con.-
temporary educators sllch as Maxine Greene: 
It may be our interest in imagination, as much as our interest in active learn-
ing, that makes us so eager to encourage a sense of agency aIIlong those with 
whom we work. By that I mean consciousness of the power to choose and to 
act upon what is chosen. I mean a willingness to take initiativ,~s, to pose crit-
ical questions, ti_~ play an authentic part in ongoing dialogues - to embark, 
whenever opportunities arise, on new beginnings. This means that we 
desire, through aesthetic education, not only to foster continually deepening 
undersmnding of the several an:s, but to empower teachers, students, parents 
- all those involved with the care and nurture of the young - to act upon 
their freedom in the world they share with others. That means resisting 
determinism, apathy, indifference, carelessness, and the numbness and 
anaesthesia that seems to affect so many people's lives. Dewey once said that 
the opposite of 'aesthetic' is indeed 'anaesthetic'. In relation to that we 
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might think of aesthetic education as education for wide-awakeness - for a 
more active, responsible, ardent mode of pursuing our human quests. 
(1988: 110-11) 
Here, then is an aesthetic vision that couples imagination with agency and 
regards the function of the aesthetic as the appreciation of difference and the 
appropriation and negotiation of such difference as sources of the self. It is a com-
pelling vision and one in keeping with our times. The question is, is it capable of 
providing a powerful foundation for an aesthetic for educational cldministration? 
Eisner, for one, has his doubts: 
One might hope that schools of education thai: prepare school administra-
tors would prOVide the kind of professional education that would enable 
them to think critically about the virtues toward which education aims. One 
might hope that such people would be encouraged to think deeply about the 
aims of education and to provide leadership and educational services to the 
community on whose support the schools depend. Unfortunately, as schools 
become more industrialized, the training programs for administrators focus 
more and more on the development of skills of labour negotiation and on 
courses offered in business schools, departments of economics, and the like. 
Such courses might have utility for some aspects of educational administra-
tion, but they are essentially technical studies. Embedded within technique 
are implicit visions of what is important, and these visions are seldom 
appraised by criteria emanating from a conception of education itself. 
(1979: 14) 
Conclusion 
It has been the argument of this chapter that a vision of educational administration 
derived from a conception of education that is indeed tTUly at~sthetic might well be 
possible and might well foon the basis for an educational administration that is 
more than simply an administrative exercise for, as Touraine points out, 'a school 
that is no more than an administrative service is unacceptable' (2000: 167). 
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